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NOTES

limitation is clearly contra to the provision for a lien on "oil territories"
as provided for in Section 55-308. This provision is the general view of
the lien law throughout the country in that one cannot create a contractual
lien on the property of another without the owner's consent. 12 In Kansas
it has been held that an oil and gas lease will create an incorporeal hereditament or profit a prendre, and that a mechanic's lien will not attach to
the interest acquired in lands by the lessee under an ordinary oil and gas
lease, notwithstanding oil or gas is discovered. 13 Oklahoma has held
these interests to be incorporeal or a profit a prendre, and further, that
they were not of such an interest as would support a judgment on real
14
estate.
From the foregoing, it appears that Section 55-401 of the Wyoming
Compiled Statutes (1945) is a modern statute, and conforms to the current
concepts of proprietary interests created by oil and gas leases. In view of
this, Sections 55-301, 55-308, 55-310 and 55-319 are of doubtful utility and
add only to the confusion regarding the interests created in oil and gas
leases, and do not afford a lienor assurance as to the extent of his security
interest.
JOHN W.

PATTNO

PINBALL MACHINES WHICH AWARD FREE GAMES AS
GAMBLING DEVICES
The manufacturers of gaming devices in the United States by constantly inventing new, ingenious machines have been able to keep ahead
of the majority of the legislation and decisions aimed at outlawing gambling. A quick look at some of these devices will show how this has been
accomplished.
When the states in which gambling is considered against public policy
began their attack on this evil, the attack was primarily directed toward
traditional gambling games such as are played with cards, dice and machines
like the roulette wheel. Such statutes were easily circumvented when the
manufacturers came out with the "one armed bandit" slot machine which
paid off in money or tokens exchangeable for money. These machines
were soon outlawed in most states by decision and legislation.
The manufacturers then turned to another "gimmick."
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clothe gambling with the legality of merchandising. They could then argue
that the purpose of a merchandising dispensing machine (which also gave
tokens) was only to stimulate sales, and thus was a species of advertising.'
These devices were constructed so that the "purchaser" of the merchandise,
usually a cheap candy or gun, would receive a varying number of tokens
at the same time the merchandise item was dispensed. These tokens could
be replayed by the purchaser into a special slot which operated different
games, like baseball, 2 which the purchaser could play, or the machine
3
would release witty sayings or prophecies on a card. In turn, such machines
were held to be gambling devices under the existing statutes in many
4
states.
It soon became apparent to. the builders of this type of device that
their business would not suffer if they dropped the feature of a reward of
cheap merchandise. 5 The pinball machine of today is the result.
Pinball machines are electrically operated games played with one or a
number of steel balls which, after being propelled to the top of an inclined
plane by the operator, roll down, coming in contact with electric points
which give the player some type of score. They are a type of "slot machine"
in the sense that a coin must be dropped into a slot before the play can
begin. Some types award tokens having value, 6 or merchandise 7 to the
successful operator. As the courts began to take notice of the pinball
device, they seemed increasingly inclined to hold them gambling devices
if the machines awarded a "thing of value." To keep a jump ahead, the
manufacturers restricted the reward to the awarding of free games to
successful players.
Pinball machines which award free games should be analyzed from
the point of view of the traditional elements of gambling-price, chance
and prize. 8 The price is generally considered the coin that the operator
must place in the machine to operate it.9 There have been no decisions
directly construing this point. However, it seems that there would be little
question that the price element is satisified in the pinball machine.
As to the element of chance, the argument has been advanced that the
element of skill dominates that of chance.' 0 The majority of courts
I
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appear to hold, however, that even though there is some element of skill
in.operating a pinball table, the element of chance dominates. 1 ' One
court has held that the skill involved is negligible when compared with
the chance.1 2 An Illinois court, under the statute of that state which
specifically provides that coin machines which are operated for amusement and depend in part on skill are not gambling devices,' 3 held that a
pinball machine in which the odds of winning could be increased by
depositing additional coins did not have enough skill involved to give it the
protection of the statute.' 4 The Supreme Court of Montana found that
the test of skill predominating over chance is not a proper one, since any
game involving skill can be a gambling device if betting is allowed. 15
The South Carolina court, in declaring a pinball machine a gaming
device, relied on the element of chance being the chief attraction.' 6 There
appears to be little question that the necessary element of chance is present
in a pinball machine.
The strongest argument raised in recent years that pinball machines
are not gaming devices is based on the asserted absence of a prize. Free
games, it was alleged, are not a "prize" in the gambling sense of the word.
17
trade checks,' 8
There seems to be little question that merchandise,
tokens' or money 2° pay-off will constitute a prize. But the contention is
that a free game has no value, and therefore cannot constitute a prize
within the elements of gambling. The free game device has been the
subject of much controversy in various courts.
It is evident that the intent behind the free game feature is to induce
the playing of the machine. It is doubtful that the machine would be
played were it not for this feature, unless there was actual betting on the
outcome or score. This chance of winning something, i.e., a free game,
for nothing, seems to be aimed at the instinct of gambling innate in man.
It may be reasoned that if one game is worth five cents to the operator, a
subsequent game must be worth an equal amount. 2 1 If one player receives
more games for his money than another there is not a uniform and fair
return for the value of each coin. 22 It is also illogical to argue that one
will spend his time and money operating a machine to obtain something
that has no value to him. The majority of courts seem therefore to hold
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that amusement in the form of a free game has value. 23 The extreme position here is that taken by the South Carolina court which held that a
pinball machine in which all the player received for being successful was
the amusement of running tip a high score did not give fair return for
value of each coin deposited. 24 The judicial consensus thus appears to be
that the right to play a pinball machine without payment is enough of a
prize to make the operation of the machine constitute gambling, provided
that the other elements of gambling are present.
The court decisions which are contrary to this majority view that
free games are things of value seem to rest primarily on differences in the
language of particular state gambling statutes. 25 For example, the Missouri
court in State v. One "Jack and Jill" Pinball Machine held that a device
which gave the successful operator free games only' was not a gaming
device as free games could not be classified as money or property within the
statute.2 0 When statutes are applied to particular factual situations it will

sometimes result that one or more of the elements of gambling were not
present. These variations in statutory language are bound to play a major
role in the determination of whether a pinball machine is to be deemed a
gambling device tinder a particular state statute.
By looking at these contra decisions it will be seen that the courts,
in construing gambling statutes, have split along two general lines. One
view is that a gambling statute is penal in nature, and therefore must be
strictly construed. 27 The second view is that gambling statutes are remedial
in nature and therefore should be liberally construed.2 8 These two different constructions will influence the court when it is faced with problems
of whether a device awards the operator a thing of value. In the absence
of express legislative direction as to whether the statute is to be considered
penal or remedial, the courts are left considerable discretion as to which
of the conflicting views is to be adopted.
Pinball machines have never been seriously challenged in Wyoming
under our gaming statutes.2 :f The Wyoming statutes, however, declare
that playing any machine, or "device of whatever nature" for "representa23.
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tives of value" is a misdemeanor3 0 and that such a device may be destroyed
by the sheriff atfer appropriate procedure has been complied with by
the officers of the court.3 1 It seems entirely possible that the Wyoming
courts could hold that a pinball machine is such a device, and that free
games are representative of value. The legislature has not specifically
declared the gaming statutes of Wyoming to be either remedial or penal.
The gaming laws are in Wyoming Compiled Statutes, 19'45, Chapter 9entitled "Criminal Offenses." 32 However, the legislature did point out
that gaming devices were considered to be a nuisance.3 3 The fact that the
gaming statutes are found in the criminal section of the statute book does
not necessarily mean that the courts must strictly construe them and it is
entirely possible that they could be construed as remedial in nature. But
until this question is presented to the Wyoming Supreme Court the answer
will remain unknown.
If the legislature deems that pinball machines are by their nature
things which are undesirable, it would appear that it would be advisable
to amend our gambling statutes to specifically prohibit them. An expression of a state policy on these devices would eliminate the doubt that may
arise. The Statc of New York has been foremost in legislation which has
sought to completely outlaw these devices, which encourage the gambling
instinct in people. 34 Legislation such as that found in New York, if
adopted in Wyoming, would make future court decisions on this point
unnecessary.
ROBERT

J.
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TRADING STAMPS
Regardless of legal concepts connected with the trading stamp, it is a
conclusive presumption that it appeals to consumers like the apple in the
Garden of Eden appealed to Eve.'
Generally, consumers receive trading stamps contemporaneously with
the cash purchase 2 of an item from a retailer who has adopted the stamp
30.
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Wyo. Comp. Stat. § 9-825 (1945).

32.
33.

Wyo. Comp. Stat. ch. 9 (1945).
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"Any gambling table, gambling device, or

paraphernalia adopted (adapted), devised or designed for the purpose of playing,
conducting, or carrying on, any game of chance, prohibited by the laws of this
state, is hereby declared to be a nuisance ...
"
New York Penal Code § 982. For a good discussion of the New York gambling
situation see 43 J.Crim.L. 114.
Life Magazine, Mar. 4, 1957, pp. 114-126. These facts brought out in the article
demonstrate the popularity of trading stamps: More than 400 stamp companies in
1956 printed nearly $600 million worth of stamps, which were sold to 170,000 businesses in this country.
Time Magazine Nov. 19, 1956, p. 97: "Trading stamp tax, passed by North
Dakota Legislature to discourage stamp giveaways, was thrown out by state's stamphungry voters in first popular referendum on issue."
Colgate-Palmolive Co., and Sperry & Hutchison Co., Intervenor v. Max Dischter &
Sons, Inc., 142 F.Supp. 545 (1956).

